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  1Introduction 
 
Our paper explores the utility of the concept of policy transfer for analysing the 
dynamics of the EU policy process. Specifically, the paper examines the liberalisation 
of two of the so-called utilities sectors: telecommunications and passenger air 
transport. Both sectors had traditionally been regarded through (western) Europe as 
public service activities. However, accompanying the creation of the single European 
market, both sectors moved incrementally to a liberalised set of regulatory 
arrangements in which the EU served as the key policy-making arena. Today, of 
course, consumers are presented with a range of service providers in both sectors: 
low-cost and full-service airlines offering intra-EU and domestic services;
2 and 
competing suppliers of a growing array of telecommunications services in fixed-line, 
data and mobile telephony as well as broadband/internet. The character of the two 
sectors has been revolutionised over the last two decades and the EU has played a 
pivotal role in both sets of developments. 
 
We utilise the concept of policy transfer in this paper because it allows a single 
framework to be applied to the different stages of the policy process: from the 
formulation to the transposition stages. Adapting Dolowitz and Marsh, we understand 
policy transfer to mean the process by which ideas, policy, administrative 
arrangements or institutions in one political setting influence policy development in 
another political setting, mediated by the institutional system of the EU.
3 The three 
stages at which policy transfer may take place are as follows: during the negotiation 
of EU policy; in putting policy into practice at EU level; and (where applicable) in 
operationalising policy at the member state level. An institutionalist account is offered 
of these stages, identifying key variables that may constrain or facilitate policy 
transfer. Important exogenous components of the account in sectors such as these are 
globalization and technological change. Policy transfer, we argue, offers a more 
neutral terminology for identifying these forces when compared with the ubiquitous 
rival terminology of Europeanisation, which runs the risk of privileging the EU as the 
driver of domestic policy change when other forces may well be at work.  
 
In the next section we set out our analytical framework. We then prepare the 
empirical analysis of the two sectors by offering a review of their (differing) 
characteristics. There then follow two sections which explore policy transfer at two 
separate stages of the policy process: the construction of the respective EU policy 
regime; and its subsequent operationalisation. In the case of the latter we focus 
particularly on operationalisation at EU level because a striking contrast between the 
two sectors is that air transport is essentially regulated at supranational level, whereas 
the telecommunications sector entails multi-tiered regulation and discretion on the 
part of the national regulatory authorities (NRAs). In both these sections of the paper 
we offer an institutionalist interpretation of change, while keeping in mind the 
sectoral dynamics deriving from international forces and technological advances. 
 
 
                                                 
2 This paper will not address the external dimension of the EU air transport policy, for example that 
covered by the Open Skies agreement, reached earlier in 2007 with the US Administration. Most 
passenger air transport between EU states and third countries has not yet been liberalised. 
3 David Dolowitz and David Marsh, Who learns what from whom; a review of the policy transfer 
literature’, Political Studies, 44, 1996, p. 344 
  2Analytical Framework  
 
Explanations of politico-economic policy change have long been preoccupied with the 
relationship between global markets and globalizing technologies as the key drivers of 
change, and the institutional environments in which change is realized. Indeed, many 
scholarly accounts of the EU’s Single Market and, later, of its Lisbon agenda see 
(economic) globalization and (technological) modernization as prime factors. Yet the 
relationship between them and the institutional environments is contested. 
‘Globalisation theorists’ see tendencies towards trans-national governance or 
convergent patterns of national policy as the more or less ineluctable outcome of 
socio-economic and technical change.
4 Institutionalists, on the other hand, ascribe 
explanatory primacy to institutional triggers for reform (e.g. court or competition 
rulings) and to the institutional environments (governance regimes, policy styles, state 
traditions, etc.) that shape the orientations of economic and political actors towards 
globalization.
5  This paper explores the complex relationship between globalization, 
institutions and EU policy transfer through analysis of liberalization and regulatory 
change in the telecommunications and airline sectors.  
 
Policy transfer has been defined as a process by which ideas, policy, administrative 
arrangements or institutions in one political setting are reproduced in another 
jurisdiction.
6 In the present context an important role is that played by the EU in 
facilitating policy transfer. The policy transfer process and mechanisms can be placed 
at any point along a continuum from ‘coercive’ transfer to ‘voluntary’ transfer, with a 
considerable amount (probably most) occurring in between these poles. Voluntary 
transfer clearly involves ‘policy learning’ whereas coercive transfer occurs where a 
government is obliged, for instance by a supranational institution, such as the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) or the EU competition authorities, to adopt a policy.
7  
 
In fact, the EU offers a number of governance patterns each with distinct institutional 
characteristics that can be expected to generate different transfer types.
8 The first can 
be identified as governance by negotiation, which reflects the traditional Community 
method of policy-making centred on negotiations within the Council of Ministers, 
with the Parliament also playing an increasingly important role. This pattern is 
conducive to a largely voluntary policy transfer process, which we might expect most 
likely to lead to a synthetic form of policy transfer, though qualified majority voting 
may introduce some elements of coercion, more conducive to emulation of a chosen 
model. The second is governance by hierarchy, which relates to those areas – like the 
single market and competition policy – where a considerable degree of direct power 
has been delegated to the supranational institutions, notably the European Court of 
Justice and the Commission. This pattern of governance clearly provides the greatest 
scope for coercive policy transfer and the strongest policy transfer outcome 
                                                 
4 Charles Kerr, John T. Dunlop, Frederick  Harbison and Charles A. Myers,  (1960), Industrialism and 
Industrial Man, Cambridge MA. Harvard University Press; Suzanne Berger and Ronald Dore, eds.  
(1996),  National Diversity and Global Capitalism, Ithaca, NY. Cornell University Press; Susan   
Strange,  (1996), ‘The Limits of Politics’, Government and Opposition 30;3, 291-311. 
5 Robert Boyer and Daniel Drache (eds), States against Markets; The Limits of Globalization, London 
and New York, Routledge, 1996. 
6 Dolowitz and Marsh, Who learns what from whom’,   p. 344. 
7 David Dolowitz and David Marsh, ‘Who learns what from whom’, pp. 344-5. 
8 See Simon Bulmer and Stephen Padgett, ‘Policy Transfer in the European Union: an Institutionalist 
Perspective’, British Journal of Political Science, 35(1), 2005, pp. 103-26.  
  3(emulation: see below). Thirdly, governance by facilitation denotes those areas of EU 
policy where the traditional Community method is not deemed appropriate and where 
instead the EU seeks to facilitate, as with the Open Method of Coordination, a more 
voluntary policy transfer process among the member states. Facilitation, however, 
might be expected to produce the weakest forms of (or no) policy transfer. 
 
Policy transfer can occur through policy emulation - involving some ‘imitating action’ 
- or through policy learning, involving ‘a redefinition of one’s interests on the basis of 
newly-acquired knowledge.’
9 Policy models are rarely transferred wholesale; more 
often they will be adapted to policy preferences in the borrower jurisdiction. Thus, our 
typology of transfer types follows Rose and Dolowitz/Marsh in categorizing transfer 
outcomes in relation to fidelity to the ‘blueprint’.
10  Emulation or copying signifies 
high fidelity. Synthesis implies a hybrid of models, often adapting existing policy in 
the borrower jurisdiction. ‘Influence’ suggests a loose form of transfer in which the 
external exemplar impacts only weakly on the outcome. Abortive transfer is where 
policy transfer fails. 
 
The principal dependent variable that interests us – the extent and quality of policy 
transfer within the EU– is explained in terms of three sets of independent variables, 
which for heuristic purposes it is useful to categorise as follows.
11 We accept first of 
all that a major independent variable driving European regulatory policy change in a 
convergent direction, towards liberalisation, might be exogenous, or ‘environmental’ 
in Scharpf’s terms.
12 It is techno-economic change, which embraces such key 
elements as the development of technologies that render national regulatory 
boundaries porous; economic globalisation and the associated drive for inward 
investment and international competitiveness; and the international regulatory 
competition (‘competitive de-regulation’ or ‘competitive emulation’) that this 
engenders. The institutions of the EU, and their varying capacity for ‘policy transfer’ 
according to the particular EU governance regime (see above), are held to be a 
second, potentially very important, possible independent variable. The EU ‘mediates’ 
the impact of exogenous forces on the member states by seeking to achieve a 
harmonised European regulatory response to the challenges of techno-economic 
change, globalisation, and the pressure of international regulatory competition. The 
third set of variables, of course, is the member states’ own policy preferences and 
national institutional profiles. This third variable applies firstly at the EU negotiation 
stage, where the member states seek to ‘up-load’ their own institutional models and/or 
policy preferences
13 into the EU policy model so as to minimise their adaptation costs 
                                                 
9 Jacint Jordana, David Levi-Faur and David Vogel, ‘The Internationalization of Regulatory Reforms: 
the Interaction of policy learning and policy emulation in the diffusion of reforms’, unpublished paper, 
presented at the workshop on The Politics of Regulation, 29-30 November 2002 at the Universitat 
Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona. 
10 Richard Rose, Lesson drawing in public policy. A guide to learning across time and space, 
(Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 1993), p. 91: David Dolowitz and David Marsh, ‘Learning from 
abroad’, p. 13.  
11 See the analytical framework in Peter Humphreys and Seamus Simpson, Globalisation, Convergence 
and European Telecommunications Regulation, Cheltenham UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward 
Elgar, 2005, pp. 1-20. 
12 Fritz W. Scharpf, Games Real Actors Play: Actor-Centered Institutionalism in Policy Research, 
Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1997, p. 44. 
13 These national preferences will naturally reflect all sorts of national political factors, most notably 
government policies (e.g. the ‘will’ to liberalize), and patterns of interest intermediation and state 
structure (affecting governments’ ‘capacity’ to deliver policies). This is a very interesting line of 
  4at the subsequent stage where they have to transpose policy and put it into practice. 
The national variable will also apply at this second ‘downloading’ stage, when the 
diversity of national policy preferences and national institutional features, such as 
regulatory structures and styles, among the EU member states may be reflected in 




In what follows we examine the relationship between the aforementioned sets of 
variables and in particular the question of whether and how market and technological 
variables might impact on the capacity of the EU institutions for policy transfer. In 
this connection, we contend that globalization and technological change, because they 
‘privilege’ neo-liberal ideas, will strengthen the potential of EU institutions for using 
or threatening to use the ‘coercive’ instruments of liberalization at its disposal – 
namely, the legal powers of the ECJ and the direct competition powers of the 
Commission. Further, globalization and technological change will produce a 
convergence of actor interests, and a consequent orientation towards pragmatic 
problem-solving rather than political bargaining in EU negotiations
15, thereby having 
a ‘facilitating’ effect on negotiated policy transfer in the EU.
16
 
If exogenous factors such as globalization and globalizing technologies are very 
strong, clearly the EU institutions might be held strictly speaking to constitute an 
intervening rather than truly independent variable. However, it is possible that EU 
institutional variables may exert a veritable independent effect. The ‘conventional’ 
view that sees recent changes in EU governance (towards the ‘regulatory state’) as 
akin to a regional sub-category of globalization has been challenged.
17  Moreover, 
globalization pressure, it has been pointed out by many, may not predispose actors 
towards convergent policies. Instead, techno-economic change can produce diverse 
national responses; it does not necessarily lead at all to convergent national policies.
18 
As Cerny has argued, the ‘competition state’ comes in many guises: the Anglo-Saxon 
neo-liberal competition state is merely the one that is often held (naturally by 
                                                                                                                                            
inquiry, but clearly we cannot pursue it further herein. See e.g. Edgar Grande and Volker Scheider, 
‘Reformstrategien und staatliche Handlungskapazitäten: Eine vergleichende Analyse institutionellen 
Wandels in der Telekommunikation in Westeuropa, Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 32 (3) 1991, pp. 
452-78. The complex relationship between national preferences, national institutional profiles and EU 
policy transfer is a key theme of Bulmer, Dolowitz, Humphreys and Padgett, Policy Transfer.    
14 To express this point in terms of the Europeanisation literature, the national diversity influences 
patterns of ‘uploading’ and ‘downloading’: see Tanja Börzel, ‘Pace-Setting, Foot-Dragging and Fence-
Sitting: Member State Responses to Europeanization’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 40/2, 2002, 
pp. 193-214. 
15 Fritz W. Scharpf, ‘The joint decision trap: lessons from German Federalism and European 
integration’,  Public Administration 66, (1988); Adrienne Héritier, Policy-Making and Diversity in 
Europe: Escape from Deadlock, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 19-20. 
16 Indeed, comparison of the telecommunications and electricity sectors does suggest that external 
variables (‘globalisation’, new technologies) were very important for explaining the different timing, 
pace and extent of the reforms of the governance of these sectors in Europe. See Peter Humphreys and 
Stephen Padgett, Globalization, the European Union, and Domestic Governance in Telecoms and 
Electricity, Governance, 19/3, July 2006, pp. 383-406. See also Bulmer, Dolowitz, Humphreys and 
Padgett, Policy Transfer in European Union Governance, 186-7.  
17 See, for instance, a paper by Nicolas Jabko, ‘The Political Origins of the Regulatory State’, prepared 
for the conference on “Theories of Regulation” organized by David Levi-Faur at the Pompeu Fabra 
University, Barcelona, November 29-30, 2002. 
18 See. e.g. Vivien Schmidt, (2002) The Futures of European Capitalism (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press). 
  5economic liberals) to be most ‘congruent’ with globalization; strong features of the 
dirigiste or mercantilist competition state may endure in other countries, not least in 
continental Europe.
19 Equally, it is conceivable that the independent effect of action 
by EU institutions might be capable of counteracting this diversity of national 
responses to globalization.  
 
 
Of phone and planes … 
 
Air transport and telecommunications share a number of broad characteristics with 
other sectors that have been subject to liberalisation in the period since the single 
European market, including postal services and electricity. Specifically, they are 
‘network sectors’ comprised of terminals, links and nodes.
20 The liberalisation 
challenge for these sectors has been to unbundle them and to introduce competition in 
service provision. How can we unpick these developments and identify the different 
stimuli arising from globalisation and technological change? The key forces for 
change have been technology, corporate dynamics, international policy trends and the 
role of international agencies. 
 
Until the 1980s telecommunications was assumed to be a natural monopoly, normally 
supplied by part of the state: the PTTs (Post, Telegraph and Telecommunications). 
The state provided a public good (service public) and assured universal service to all 
citizens. Rapid technological change in the 1980s and 1990s completely changed the 
character of the telecommunications network. Terminal equipment was revolutionised 
by computerisation; multiple technologies emerged to provide competing networks 
(cable, satellite, microwave and mobile telephony – followed later by the internet); 
and the shift from mechanical to digital/packet switching at nodes expanded the 
capacity of the networks. The sector is no longer regarded as a natural monopoly and 
technology can easily bypass any effort to retain the integrity of a national 
telecommunications market. In turn this technological change has fuelled 
globalisation. Telecoms provision and price became important determinants of 
business location, thus unleashing regulatory competition in the sector.  
 
The impact of technology on the air transport sector was rather different. It was 
already international in orientation. There were, of course, technological advances: jet 
aircraft, wide-bodied planes, fuel-efficient jet engines and the growth of smaller, 
regional airliners. However, these changes did not of themselves undermine the 
default situation in most European states, namely: a state-licensed/owned national 
flag-carrying airline; bilateral regulation by governments of market access (one airline 
per country); bilateral price-fixing and revenue-sharing between airlines; and state 
subsidies to cover any operating losses.
21 The key difference was that airspace was 
regarded as a matter of national sovereignty in a way that telephone infrastructure was 
                                                 
19 See Peter Humphreys and Seamus Simpson, ‘Globalization, the “Competition” State and the Rise of 
the “Regulatory” State in European Telecommunications’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 45 (3), 
2007, forthcoming. 
20 Nicholas Argyris, ‘Regulatory Reform in the EU Utilities Sectors, with Particular Reference to 
Telecommunications’, paper at UACES annual conference, University of Surrey, 7 January 1997. 
21 For a more nuanced and detailed version of the status quo ante, see K. Armstrong and S. Bulmer, 
The governance of the Single European Market, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1998, pp. 
171-5. 
  6not. Moreover, many of the technological advances relating to the terminals, links and 
nodes have post-dated liberalisation, responding to the congestion that has ensued 
from greater competition. Examples include introducing competition into ground-
handling services and improving air traffic control systems and their inter-operability. 
 
Changing  corporate dynamics are a typical response to the availability of new 
technology. In telecommunications four discrete markets can be observed: for 
equipment; basic services; advanced services; and infrastructure. Equipment suppliers 
had traditionally had a very close relationship with ‘their’ national PTT. However, the 
high costs of the new technology encouraged industry consolidation, which took place 
on an international basis. The initial liberalisation by the EU of advanced services 
encouraged a surge of corporate alliances between key European telecommunications 
providers with other global corporations, such as AT&T, Sprint and MCI, as well as 
with each other. The objective here was to offer global telecommunications solutions 
to the corporate sector. But this ‘global player vocation’ led the telecommunications 
incumbents to relax their obstruction of the liberalisation of basic services (voice 
telephony) for consumers and of the infrastructure. Efforts by individual 
telecommunications providers – by incumbents and new entrants alike - have 
followed the market opportunities offered by new technologies and by the opening of 
national markets as EU liberalisation took hold.  
 
Corporate behaviour in air transport has tended to follow regulatory rather than 
technological change, reflecting the distinctive significance of national sovereignty in 
shaping the sector. The bilateral regulation of market access on international routes 
determined the licensing of nationally owned carriers, and often nationalised ones at 
that. Only in the UK, with a long-standing multi-airline policy for domestic and 
international services that permitted the development of private-sector carriers (for 
example, British Caledonian) and in the Netherlands, where KLM was not wholly 
state-owned, were there corporate pressures to change the character of the sector. Sir 
Freddie Laker’s transatlantic ‘Skytrain’ service and domestic liberalisation under the 
Thatcher government represented new market opportunities but it was not until the 
wholesale changes in regulatory structure, brought about in the 1980s and 1990s by 
the EU, that corporate re-structuring developed apace. Flag-carriers used alliance 
strategies and mergers and acquisitions to develop (or defend) market-share. 
Privatisation became a parallel process, starting with British Airways in 1987. 
Financially weaker carriers, such as (initially) Air France, Alitalia and Olympic (of 
Greece), were dependent on state aid. The Belgian carrier SABENA went bankrupt in 
2001. However, the growth of low-cost carriers (LCCs) with full EU liberalisation in 
the 1990s brought fast-growing new entrants, such as easyJet, Ryanair and Air Berlin, 
creating pressures on the previously discrete sub-sector of charter airlines. These 
carriers, traditionally associated with offering flights in conjunction with package 
holidays, found a new challenge from consumers booking their own vacations using a 
combination of LCCs and accommodation arranged over the internet.  
 
In both sectors international trends in policy played a significant role in spreading 
ideas about policy development. Neo-liberal ideas have been prominent. They are 
important to both sectors but in air transport, given the absence of any specific 
technological trigger, play a proportionately more significant role. International trends 
can unleash regulatory competition, as suggested earlier in the paper, or even 
‘herding’ whereby actors follow signals from the international system rather than 
  7designing policy in response to ‘local’ circumstances. The basic ideas of air transport 
liberalisation can be traced back to the 1978 Airline Deregulation Act under the 
Carter Administration. This reform was confined to domestic transport in the United 
States (USA), however, and did not immediately lend itself to international air 
transport because of presumptions about the sovereignty of airspace. Significantly, 
some liberalisation was sought in bilateral regulation between the USA and the 
Netherlands, while the Thatcher government moved to de-regulate domestic air 
transport. These two European states were to be key players in the air transport policy 
transfer process. In telecommunications a number of regulatory and legal decisions 
taken under the Reagan presidency were decisive.
22 The transformation of the former 
US telecommunications monopoly operator AT&T into a data-processing business 
resulted in its emergence onto the world market, along with competing firms. The US 
Administration championed this development. The UK and Japan embarked on their 
own policy reforms, thus giving global liberalisation an irresistible stimulus and 
promoting the international exchange of policy ideas on sectoral regulation. Mostly 
hesitant at first, the continental European governments came to accept that – 
ultimately - full liberalization was vital for the competitiveness both of their national 
telecommunications sectors and, given the latter’s strategic importance, of their 
economies at large.   
 
Unsurprisingly, a range of international actors and organisations have played a role 
in both sectors, both at European and international levels.
23 Long-standing sectoral 
bodies such as the International Telecommunications Union and the International 
Civil Aviation Organization (comprising governments) and the International Air 
Transport Association (IATA, comprising major airlines) declined in importance as 
the liberalisation process gathered momentum. However, the Paris-based European 
Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC), the regional counterpart to the ICAO, and with a 
membership approximating that of the Council of Europe, proved to be an important 
agent in policy transfer. With the European Communities not having clearly 
established responsibility for air transport, ECAC proved to be an important body for 
discussing the ideas and experience of de-regulation in the USA. Under the influence 
of the British and Dutch governments, the key protagonists of liberalisation, ECAC 
produced the COMPAS Report, a possible blueprint for reform of bilateral air 
transport in Europe.
24 The report was controversial within ECAC; it was not official 
policy. In telecommunications a major development has been the sector’s emergence 
as an issue in international trade negotiations. In 1986, as the momentum towards 
liberalisation gathered pace, the USA and the United Kingdom (UK) were able to 
place telecommunications services on the agenda of the Uruguay Round of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Global liberalisation of the sector 
subsequently played a key role in negotiations within the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO). 
 
A key distinction between the sectors was the fact that telecommunications had 
always been seen as of special strategic economic importance (rather akin to the 
                                                 
22 Jeremy Tunstall, (1986) Communications Deregulation: The Unleashing of America's 
Communications Industry, Oxford: Blackwell. 
23 See Bulmer, Dolowitz, Humphreys and Padgett, Policy Transfer in European Union Governance,  
pp. 50-3. 
24 ECAC European Civil Aviation Conference (1982) ‘Report on Competition in Intra-European Air 
Services’, ECAC Doc. No. 25, Paris: ECAC. 
  8defence sector). In telecommunications, much more so than air transport, a 
mercantilistic ‘competition state’ orientation was strongly evident as states typically 
pursued highly interventionist strategies to promote technological development in 
terminals, advanced services and networks for the sake of national economic 
competitiveness, increasingly so as telecommunications came to be perceived as the 
‘nerve system’ of the global information society. The ways states did this varied 
according to their differing ‘competition state’ institutional architectures, state 
traditions, policy styles, resource endowments and strategic capacities.
25 Thus, states’ 
responses to the pressures of the international regulatory competition unleashed by 
US liberalisation varied considerably: the UK, for instance, embraced a distinctly neo-
liberal approach, whilst mercantilist France by contrast continued to favour a stronger 
role for the state. Path dependence meant that this diversity of ‘competition state’ 
institutions and regulatory practices was likely to shape, and be reflected in, the 
emergent EU liberalization regime.
26 Above all, though, the perceived high strategic 
importance of telecommunications made it unlikely that the ‘competition states’ 
would cede control to a centralized European regulatory authority. In air transport 
national mercantilist strategies over the airliner manufacturing industry at national 
level, notably in France, the UK and, to a lesser extent, the Netherlands, had been 
superseded by the emergence of Airbus.
27 The liberalisation of air transport was not 
regarded as intimately linked to the fate of Airbus, however. Of course, national 
governments typically championed their own flagcarrying airline. Similarly they also 
supported the strategic development of a major airport within their boundaries 
(London Heathrow, Amsterdam Schipol and so on). But the more ‘physical’ nature of 
the sector (aircraft, airports) and the continued assumption of national sovereignty 




Building the EU Regimes 
 
In examining policy transfer at this phase of the policy cycle we explore three 
hypotheses. The first is that qualified majority voting in the Council of Ministers – 
particularly if practised, but in any event if provided for – has the potential for 
enabling stronger forms of policy transfer (emulation or synthesis). By contrast, 
unanimity is likely to only permit a weaker form: influence or even abortive transfer. 
Our second hypothesis is related, namely that the processes and outcomes of policy 
transfer are dependent on the mode of negotiation employed. The key distinction here 
is between bargaining and problem-solving patterns of EU decision-making.
28 The 
                                                 
25 In Cerny’s words, the ‘competition state …comes in myriad forms’.  Philip Cerny, ‘Restructuring the 
Political Arena: Globalization and the Paradoxes of the Competition State’, in R.D. Germain (ed.) 
Globalization and its Critics: Perspectives from Political Economy, London: Macmillan, 2000, p. 130. 
26 See Peter Humphreys and Seamus Simpson, ‘Globalization, the “Competition” State and the Rise of 
the “Regulatory” State in European Telecommunications’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 45 (3), 
2007, forthcoming. 
27 See Martin Staniland, Government Birds. Air Transport and the State in Western Europe, Lanham, 
MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003, pp. 138-66. 
28 On these patterns, see Fritz Scharpf, ‘The joint decision trap: lessons from German federalism and 
European integration’, Public Administration, 66/3 (1988): 239-78; Adrienne Héritier, ‘The 
accommodation of diversity in European policy-making and its outcomes: regulatory policy as a 
patchwork’, Journal of European Public Policy, 3/2 (1996): 149-67; O. Elgström, and C. Jönsson, 
‘Negotiation in the European Union: bargaining or problem-solving?’ Journal of European Public 
  9latter variant emphasises mutual gains and is likely to enable stronger transfer 
outcomes, whilst the former is more self-interested and conflictual and therefore 
likely to enable weaker forms of transfer. Thirdly, the use of pre-existing EU 
institutional powers under hierarchical governance, notably ECJ rulings or the 
Commission’s use of its quasi-judicial powers can also serve to bring about coercive 
policy transfer.
29 These three hypotheses are utilised in order to shed light not only on 
the importance of EU institutions but also to judge their explanatory power alongside 




In telecommunications, EU liberalization occurred through a two-stage negotiation 
process. The first stage saw the incremental enactment during the 1990s of a series of 
Commission liberalization Directives, under EU competition law (Article 86). At first 
this apparent by-passing of the customary community method of negotiation in the 
Council and European Parliament (EP) was very controversial, but the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) responded to the contention of some member states that the 
Commission’s use of this competition article in this way exceeded its powers by 
ruling that its use of this ‘coercive’ instrument was in order. However, in reality, the 
Commission was very careful – not least because of the controversy over the 
liberalisation procedure - to move forward in consensus with the member states. 
Hence, from the so-called ‘Open Network Provision (ONP) compromise’ of 1990 
onwards, the liberalization Directives were accompanied by a series of Council and 
Parliament regulatory harmonization Directives, which culminated in the ‘1998 
regulatory package’ of sector-specific telecommunications rules, negotiated in the 
customary manner. The second stage – essentially the negotiation of a new electronic 
communications regulatory framework, agreed in 2002 – did not prescribe any new 
liberalization, apart from a single very important EU regulation opening up the 
incumbent’s dominance of the ‘local loop’ (the ‘last mile’ from the local exchange to 
the household), and essentially amounted to a streamlining of the 1998 regulatory 
package; it reduced the number of Directives and aimed at a reduction of the 
regulatory burden as markets were judged to become open and competitive.
30   
 
EU telecommunications liberalization therefore involved an important element of 
harmonising re-regulation. This meant the design of new EU-wide regulations and 
regulatory instruments to establish a level playing field for the promotion of 
competition and to prevent the former monopoly operators (the incumbents) from 
abusing the market dominance that they carried over from their former monopoly 
status to the disadvantage of new entrants. Inevitably, in the negotiation process the 
member states, whose liberalization and re-regulatory preferences varied according to 
their different competition state orientations and their various resource and strategic 
capacity endowments, had the opportunity to shape the EU regime to minimise the 
anticipated adaptation costs that they would incur, by ‘up-loading’ their preferences 
into the EU regime. Very broadly, the UK led a ‘northern camp’ of liberalization 
                                                                                                                                            
Policy 7/5 (2000): 684-704; also Bulmer, Dolowitz, Humphreys and Padgett, Policy Transfer in EU 
Governance, p. 21. 
29 For fuller elaboration, see Bulmer, Dolowitz, Humphreys and Padgett, Policy Transfer in EU 
Governance, p. 21-3. 
30 For a detailed account see Humphreys and Simpson,  Globalisation, Convergence and European 
Telecommunications Regulation, pp. . 
  10‘pace-setters’; France led a camp of liberalization ‘foot-draggers’, much more 
concerned about retaining state control of the sector; while Germany – largely due to 
complex domestic political constraints
31 – was a ‘fence-sitter’.
32 However, over time, 
an EU-wide consensus in favour of full telecommunications liberalisation emerged.  
 
What were the impacts of – and the relationship between - our independent variables? 
Firstly, the effects of globalization (and globalizing technologies) were clearly a very 
important factor for achievement of the basic member state consensus over full 
liberalization. The global ambitions of incumbent operators in a number of ‘fence-
sitting’ (Germany) or ‘foot-dragging’ (France, Spain) states was a major factor in 
shifting national positions towards full liberalization (and, indeed, also part-
privatisation of the incumbents, which was not part of the EU package).  Secondly, 
globalization clearly gave the EU institutions a strong normative mandate to push 
forward the liberalization agenda, manifest in the Commission’s use of Article 86 to 
issue the liberalization Directives under its own authority and also manifest in the 
European Court of Justice’s support for such a procedure. Given the emergent 
Member State consensus, the element of coercion should certainly not be overstated, 
yet the fact remains that the negotiation of the Council and EP regulatory 
harmonisation Directives did occur under the ‘shadow of coercion’. As one 
interviewee in the Commission (July 12, 2000) pointed out in connection with the 
crucially important ‘ONP compromise’: ‘The [Commission] directive liberalizing 
services was “self standing”, [having] all the basic elements which would make it 
possible to function, should the Council block the other Directives. So there was a 
strong political push for the Council and Parliament to agree the ONP directive’
33. 
Thirdly, globalization affected the style of EU negotiation. After some early 
polarization between liberalization enthusiasts and laggards, the negotiations soon 
exhibited a problem-solving, rather than a hard bargaining, style. For the most part, 
disputes were resolved in COREPER working groups. Globalization therefore clearly 
had an important impact on the institutional dynamics of EU policy transfer. While 
clearly the EU’s policy transfer capacity was considerably strengthened by the 
Commission’s use of its hierarchical powers and by the problem-solving style of 
negotiation, with globalization playing a role, it is less clear that qualified majority 
voting was an important factor. The regulatory harmonisation Directives all provided 
for QMV. The shadow of the vote may have served to alter the negotiating calculus of 
some member states. However, the causal effect of QMV is hard to judge given the 
dynamics of globalization and other EU institutional effects that have been described.   
 
Despite the broad consensus in favour of liberalization, in telecommunications the 
national preferences variable was reflected first of all in the timing of the 
                                                 
31 For detail on Germany’s ‘fence-sitting’, and its subsequent turn towards full liberalization, see Simon 
Bulmer, David Dolowitz, Peter Humphreys and Stephen Padgett, ‘Electricity and Telecommunications: 
Fit for the European Union’, in Kenneth Dyson and Klaus Goetz (eds), Germany, Europe and the 
Politics of Constraint, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 251-69. 
32 See Tanja Börzel, ‘Pace-Setting, Foot-Dragging and Fence-Sitting: Member State Responses to 
Europeanization’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 40/2, 2002, pp. 193-214. 
33 The principal of Open Network Provision underpins the whole EU regulatory framework for the 
liberalized telecommunications sector. It establishes the principle of harmonised conditions of access to 
public networks and services according to standards of objectivity, transparency and non-
discrimination. It was first enacted in the Framework Directive that accompanied the Commission’s 
advanced services directive; ONP was subsequently enacted for leased lines and then voice telephony 
services.   
  11liberalization process. The need to respect differing Member State orientations 
explained the incrementalism of the EU liberalization process, which occurred over 
the period 1988-1998. An important result of this timing was that much of the EU 
liberalisation process occurred after the Maastricht Treaty had strengthened 
subsidiarity in the EU, thereby making it even less likely (than already suggested 
above) that the member states would cede control to a centralized EU regulatory 
agency for telecommunications. Secondly, the fact that the Commission liberalisation 
Directives were accompanied by Council and EP regulatory harmonisation Directives 
gave the opportunity to so-inclined countries (most notably France and Belgium) to 
mainstream service public provisions (for instance, the universal services directive) in 
the 1998 regulatory package. The UK model was clearly only ‘influential’. The UK’s 
own early liberalization steps gave credence to the Commission’s proposals and the 
UK formed a special policy axis with the Commission. Above all, the UK’s success in 
stimulating new services, transforming British Telecom into an international player 
and promoting the UK as an attractive business location, exerted a major 
demontration effect on the ‘foot draggers’ and ‘fence sitters’, and strengthened the 
Commission’s hand in pushing reform onwards. However, the EU model that 
emerged was inevitably a ‘synthesis’ of Member State influences, and – perhaps 
above all - it allowed considerable scope for national discretion at the transposition 
and regulatory implementation (‘downloading’) stage, as will be seen in the next 




The experience with air transport liberalisation exhibits parallels but also some 
important distinctive features. Early efforts at liberalization within the European 
Communities from the late-1970s were frustrated by the lack of clear supranational 
competence. A very limited piece of legislation – the Council Directive on Inter-
Regional Air Services – was agreed in 1983; otherwise, powers remained with 
member governments. Discussion of more significant moves for liberalisation was 
confined to ECAC, where the British and Dutch delegations were influential on the 
COMPAS Report, which however did not represent official ECAC policy. The report 
was in turn influential on the Commission’s Memorandum No. 2, published in 1984.
34 
However, the pressures of globalisation were insufficient to drive the policy debate in 
the direction of liberalisation. In fact the key changes to the negotiating context came 
from four institutional developments.  
 
First, in April 1986 the ECJ’s Nouvelles Frontières judgement ruled that the existing 
regulatory arrangements underpinning air transport between the member states were 
in breach of European competition law.
35 In June the Commission’s competition 
directorate-general charged ten airlines with infringements but used proceedings as a 
threat suspended over member governments and their airlines, should they not agree 
to liberalisation in the regular policy-making process. The timing of this action 
coincided with the second development, namely the dynamic new Delors Commission 
and its pro-active Competition Commissioner, Peter Sutherland. Thirdly, air transport 
liberalisation had been included, albeit in rather vague terms, in the Commission’s 
White Paper on completing the internal market. The single market, of course, had a 
                                                 
34 CEC (1984) Towards the Development of a Community Air Transport Policy, COM (84) 72 final, 
Brussels. 
35 Joined cases 209-13/84, Ministère Public v. Asjes and others [1986] ECR 1425. 
  12major dynamising impact on the EC in the late-1980s.
36 Finally, the Single European 
Act of 1986 included a treaty change that provided for QMV on air transport policy. 
These new institutional resources at supranational level were crucial to air transport 
liberalisation. 
 
Up to that point the governments of the UK and the Netherlands, the protagonists of 
liberalisation, had been unable to make much headway beyond secure some sympathy 
from the European Commission. Instead they had turned their efforts to bilateral steps 
of varying degrees of liberalisation. The initial move in 1984-5 was to liberalisation 
with each other and then through more limited measures with other states, such as 
Ireland, Luxembourg, Belgium and Germany. The French and Italian governments 
remained wedded to the public service ethos and were hostile to EC-wide 
liberalisation. Germany and Denmark had special concerns that led them to caution: 
in the former case the country’s division and Lufthansa’s inability to fly to Berlin 
under its four-power status; in the latter the tri-national nature of its flag carrier, 
Scandinavian Airlines System, was problematic in view of the absence from the EC of 
Sweden and Norway. The general rule was that the flag carrier’s policy was aligned 
with that of its respective government, so British Airways and the independent carrier 
British Midland along with the Dutch KLM were amongst the few corporate 
protagonists. Labour was hostile for fear of seeing a decline in working conditions 
such as had occurred following de-regulation in the USA.  
 
The basic thrust of the Commission’s Memorandum No. 2 was threefold: to replace 
existing multiple bilateral regulatory regimes with one supranational one; to reduce 
collusive behaviour between governments/airlines on access to the market, tariffs and 
revenue-sharing; and to apply European competition rules except in the case of certain 
negotiated exemptions. The achievement of these goals was blocked by member state 
resistance until the 1986 Nouvelles Frontières ruling which, together with the 
Competition Commissioner’s threatened legal action, forced the foot-dragging 
majority of states into problem-solving mode, for the status quo ante could no longer 
be defended. Thus it was the impact of the ECJ ruling that facilitated the first, 
December 1987, package of measures by providing a strong normative mandate for 
liberalisation. QMV was not really a factor at this stage because the SEA only came 
into effect shortly before agreement.  
 
The first package, like its successors, liberalised fares, access to the market as well as 
adjusting the competition rules applicable in the sector. Succeeding packages were 
agreed in 1990 and 1992 but it was not until 1997 that full liberalisation was 
operational. The negotiation of the second and third packages was not easy and 
various concessions or time-limited derogations were agreed in order to secure 
agreement. These concessions were made in a problem-solving context, designed to 
buy off potential opponents and build up a significant majority support, if not 
complete consensus. By the third package the foot-draggers had been reduced in 
numbers to southern states, such as Portugal and Greece. Following unification 
Germany became a cautious protagonist, while Ireland proved to be a ‘swing state’, 
having come to see the benefits of Anglo-Irish bilateral liberalisation (which had 
given rise to the creation of Ryanair). The threat of a decision by QMV was more 
important than its actual usage. 
                                                 
36 Armstrong and Bulmer, The governance of the Single European Market. 
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By 1997 the whole basis of air transport liberalisation had been transformed and 
paved the way for the emergence of LCCs across the EU, the establishment of new 
routes, the growth of new airport hubs served by LCCs (such as Frankfurt Hahn, 
Berlin Schönefeld London Stansted and Girona). This development was remarkable, 
given the original protagonists represented a minority position within the EC. In view 
of the international nature of the reforms they were more radical than the domestic 
ones in the USA.
37 In terms of policy transfer the UK – specifically encouraged by 
the free-market Secretary of State for Transport, Nicholas Ridley, in the second 
Thatcher government – and the Netherlands had exported the ideas of liberalisation to 
ECAC. The COMPAS report was a valuable blueprint for the Transport Directorate 
General of the Commission. With the coercive power of the Nouvelles Frontières 
ruling suspended above the Council of Transport Ministers, there was an important 
transfer of policy ideas to the EC. By the time of the final package, measures had 
gone beyond those in the COMPAS Report. The EC’s institutional resources, 
specifically its ECJ rulings and the threat by the Commission to use its competition 
powers were decisive in creating the problem-solving climate in the Council. Indeed, 
the strongest element of policy transfer was arguably the exporting of competition 
rules (through ECJ rulings) to a sector that had been presumed exempt from them. 
Globalisation had a background effect but nothing more specific than that, as is 
evidenced in tortuous efforts to establish liberalised external agreements. It was not 
until 2007 that an Open Skies agreement was secured with the USA. As for national 
variables, the need to take into account differing circumstances was handled through 
phased introduction of liberalisation and time-restricted derogations in certain cases. 
The dynamics are therefore different from those in telecommunications. Another 
important distinction, as will be seen in the next section, is that the air transport 
legislation was by means of Regulations, thus eliminating member states authorities’ 
discretion. In consequence, EU authorities assumed exclusive regulatory competences 




Regulating the EU Regimes 
 
In exploring the character of the ensuing regulatory regimes for telecommunications 
and air transport we focus on the factors that have promoted the practice on the 
ground (or air!) of the agreed regulatory regimes. We may identify two ideal-type 
regulatory regimes. One is based on governance by hierarchy, where the supranational 
authorities have strongly enshrined powers. In ideal-type format such regulatory 
regimes are supported by dense rules, sanctions (or incentives) on the part the 
supranational institutions, judicial powers, legislative instruments and a supportive set 
of political norms.  Our hypothesis is that regulatory regimes of this type bring about 
strong policy transfer effects (emulation or synthesis). A second type of regulatory 
regime relies upon facilitated governance. In this case we find the EU playing a 
facilitating role, deploying soft or flexible rules to persuade member states to reassess 
their policy practices. Although much less densely institutionalised than under 
hierarchy, there can be significant variation depending on the terms of reference for 
                                                 
37 As a result of a further ECJ judgement in 1989 the European legislation also applied to domestic air 
transport in the member states. See Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen und Silver Line Reisebüro v. Zentrale zur 
Bekämpfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs e.V.: case 66/86 [1989] ECR 803. 
  14the regime, the density of networks, the different patterns of operation (benchmarking, 
peer review etc.). Policy transfer effectively occurs by diffusion between member 
state authorities. We hypothesise that transfer under such conditions will be more 
limited (influence or abortive). These are two ideal types of regime. In what follows 
air transport corresponds most closely to a hierarchical regime. Telecommunications, 




The EU regulatory regime for telecommunications that emerged from the 1998 
package, only slightly modified by the streamlined 2002 package, is a mixture of EU-
hierarchy and national discretion. Because of the member states’ persistent refusal to 
countenance the establishment of a European regulatory agency for 
telecommunications - despite some support for the latter from within the 
Commission
38 and strong support from the European Parliament, transnational 
telecommunications users and new entrants - regulatory responsibility resides 
primarily with National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) acting under national law but 
in conformity with EU legislation. While the telecommunications regulatory regime is 
still strongly defined and institutionalized (in comparison with electricity for 
instance), the EU Directives nonetheless allowed considerable scope for 
‘domestication’ in their transposition into national law by the member states and in 
their implementation by the national regulators, principally the NRAs. Moreover, 
while the Commission clearly has powers to initiate legal action against the member 
states’ non-compliance with EU-agreed principles and practices, it has tended to rely 
more on its ‘softer’ powers of persuasion. It has preferred to ‘name and shame’ poor 
performers through regular implementation reports (12 to date), to draft benchmarks, 
conduct inquiries into particular markets, to issue reports on particular regulatory 
issues, and generally encourage wherever possible mutual policy learning among the 
national regulators. 
 
What is the significance of these characteristics of the EU regulatory regime for EU 
policy transfer in telecommunications? In fact, the way that the new regulatory 
institutions (notably the NRAs) have been configured and the spirit in which the new 
regulatory principles and instruments have been operationalized by the member states 
has  been crucially important for the functioning (as distinct from the merely formal 
legal establishment on 1
st January 1998) of the internal market in telecommunications 
and, in turn, for the Commission’s avowed goal of the creation of globally 
competitive pan-European telecommunications players and a competitive European 
information society. When sufficient discretion is left to the member states, a 
nominally pro-competitive regulatory regime can plainly have a ‘Janus-face’. 
Regulatory activity might either be deployed in the spirit of the neo-liberal 
‘competition state’ to promote new economic activity and investment through diligent 
market opening, or alternatively it could be deployed in more mercantilistic fashion, 
to give national champions (usually the incumbents) a regulatory subsidy.
39 
                                                 
38 It was a recommendation of the 1994 Bangemann report. 
39 See Humphreys and Simpson, ‘Globalization, the “Competition” State and the Rise of the 
“Regulatory” State’, forthcoming. 
  15Examination of the domestic regimes in the telecommunications sector suggests 
considerable evidence of the latter.
40  
 
The regulatory harmonisation Directives established a set of principles and minimum 
requirements that the member states were obliged to implement, but the means of 
implementation was a matter that allowed considerable discretion to the member 
states. Thus, the 1990 ONP Directive specified only the need for regulation that was 
independent of the operators and sufficiently resourced; it did not attempt to 
harmonize the NRAs’ institutional form or manner of operation. In fact, NRAs varied 
very considerably in terms of resources and therefore their regulatory capacities. They 
also differed considerably in terms of their independence, both politically and where 
states retained a stake in the incumbent also vis-à-vis these operators. Until recently 
licences were granted at the national level, the NRAs deciding whether individual 
licences were required or whether general authorizations would suffice. Although a 
1997 Licensing Directive sought to restrict the use of individual licences and 
encourage market entry, in practice licensing regimes could vary considerably on a 
light-onerous scale in terms of the regulatory burden that they placed on new entrants. 
While the ONP (1990, 1992, 1995) and Interconnection Directives (1997) prescribed 
cost-orientation and transparency, the fact that it was left to the NRAs – not the 
Commission – actually to conduct audits of the operators’ practice opened up scope 
for considerable variation here. Moreover, in order to ensure universal service, 
namely a minimum level of service at an affordable price for all users,
41 Member 
states were allowed discretion to impose special national requirements on operators.  
 
The decentralized character of regulation-in-practice quickly revealed some 
regulatory shortfalls.
42 The main persistent problems have been: 1) Inconsistency in 
the conditions – light or onerous - that member states have attached to authorisations 
(licences). Despite a provision in the 2002 regulatory package mandating the granting 
of (light) general authorisations, inconsistency persists with regard to key areas of 
discretion that have been left to the member states, notably regarding the use of scarce 
radio spectrum. This has hampered the introduction of pan-European services. 2) 
There have been repeated complaints (from new entrants) about the lack of 
transparent procedures for the setting of interconnection tariffs, with suggestions of a 
regulatory bias towards the incumbents in some cases. 3) The inadequacy of 
mechanisms of dispute resolution and the suspension of regulatory decisions by some 
national courts during appeals. 4) The aforementioned variety in the quality of 
regulation and the weakness of some national regulators in terms of resources, 
expertise and/or independence. 5) A lack of consistency regarding remedies to 
competition problems that have been adopted in the different member states. It is 
highly significant that this was a key area of regulatory activity where the attempts of 
                                                 
40 For detail see Bulmer, Dolowitz, Humphreys and Padgett, Policy Transfer in EU Governance, pp. 
136-78. 
41 This included the provision of the public fixed telephone network, supporting voice telephony, fax 
and voice band data transmission via modems (enabling basic Internet access); the provision of fixed 
public telephone service; the provision of operator assistance and directory services; the provision of 
public pay phones; and the provision of services under special terms and special facilities for customers 
with disabilities and special social needs 
42 For a powerful critique of this decentralized regulatory regime, see Giandomenico Majone ‘The 
Credibility Crisis of Community Regulation’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 38/2: 283. He goes 
so far as to cite telecommunications as an example of this ‘credibility crisis’. This is not a position 
shared here, though the critique does point to real regulatory shortfalls.   
  16the 2002 regulatory package to tighten up harmonisation failed to give the 
Commission a veto over NRA decisions (and which it is worth noting again currently 
features on the Commisson’s reform agenda). Moreover, a questionnaire survey of the 
NRAs revealed significant differences among them regarding their attitudes to the 
promotion of competition in telecommunications. For example, the Belgian regulator 
did not even believe that determining the effectiveness of competition was its 
responsibility. Above all, ‘there were clear differences in perceptions of the extent to 
which competition had developed in telecommunications, the need for more 
competition and even of the desirability of the competition that had developed’.
43  
 
In sum, the experience of this two-tier, ‘decentralised’ governance regime in 
telecommunications, reveals that the transfer of supranational rules to the domestic 
level represents at best synthesis but more typically influence and some examples of 
abortive transfer (in instances of very weak or non-compliance by member states). 
The impact of national institutional profiles is important at this stage of the policy 
transfer process. Consequently, transfer is much weaker than in the hierarchical 





The distinctive characteristic of air transport regulation is the delegation of the key 
regulatory powers to the directorate general for transport (DG VII, then DG TREN). 
The use of Regulations pre-empted the need for domestic transposition of legislation: 
an important point at which national institutional patterns can undermine the fidelity 
of policy transfer to the member states. Thus in the limited areas where member state 
authorities are in fact empowered to take decisions, any misinterpretation – deliberate 
or otherwise – may be over-ruled directly by the Commission. Resort to the Court 
only occurs should the member state authority appeal against the Commission’s 
action. It should also be underlined that the Commission’s writ extends to regulating 
domestic as well as inter-state air travel. At the same time, the scope of the 
Commission to regulate some aspects of corporate behaviour in the sector – typically 
that of an anti-competitive nature – was reinforced. The Commission’s authority on 
competition policy is also characteristically hierarchical in nature.  
 
It is possible to identify three key consequences of the air transport regulatory regime. 
One concerns the direct operation of the legislation and tests of the Commission’s 
resolve to uphold the agreed rules. Secondly, the European Commission had to tighten 
up its rules on state aid to ensure that some states – typically the laggards – did not try 
to subvert liberalisation through bailing out their flag carrier by underwriting its losses 
and thus undermining the notion of a level playing-field. A final aspect concerns the 
need to extend the scope of the regime, as related issues such as ground-handling or 
access to take-off and landing slots came into focus. 
 
The Commission experienced some early tests of resolve on applying the rules, and 
they continue to this day. These tests have typically originated from laggard states. 
Thus, in 1993 the French authorities refused to allow TAT (a French airline which 
                                                 
43 See T. Dassler and D. Parker, ‘Harmony or Disharmony in the Regulation and Promotion of 
Competition in EU Telecommunications. A Survey of the Regulatory Offices’, Utilities Policy, 12, 
2004, pp. 9-28. 
  17was 49.9 per cent owned by British Airways, BA) and British airlines to fly from 
Paris-Orly to London Heathrow on the grounds of congestion at the former. Air 
France, however, had timetabled services for the route from March 1994. TAT 
appealed to the Commission and the decision of the French authorities was overruled. 
This and similar decisions quickly established that member state authorities had 
limited scope to exploit regulatory provisions unfairly. French authorities have also 
been challenged in regard to the allocation of ‘slots’ at Orly.
44 Another area of dispute 
has concerned national authorities’ allegedly arbitrary declaration of routes as subject 
to Public Service Obligation (PSO): whereby airlines go through a tendering process 
rather than being able to compete on the route. For example, in 2006 Ryanair 
experienced a PSO declaration that ended its provision of services from the Italian 
mainland to Sardinia. A Commission investigation ruled in 2007, albeit after lengthy 
investigation, that the Italian authorities had breached the terms of EU legislation. 
 
The success of the Commission in regulating state aids to airlines (under Articles 87 
and 88 of the EC Treaty) has been rather more contested. Such subsidies are likely to 
favour incumbents – some still subject to partial or full state ownership – rather than 
private new entrants. Unusually control over state aids is in the hands of DG TREN 
(formerly DG VII) rather than DG Competition, as is the case generally. Would this 
location of authority result in industry-friendly rulings? The regulation of state aids 
was only really activated from the 1990s.
45 The proclivities of governments to give 
such aid is exacerbated by the cyclical nature of the industry and its susceptibility to 
adverse international conditions (such as the first Gulf War and ‘9/11’, both of which 
led to a sudden drop in patronage).
46 Efforts to introduce a ‘one time, last time’ policy 
on state aid were not entirely successful, as Olympic and Alitalia came back for 
approval of a second round of assistance. The latter’s 2005 aid from the Italian 
government was permitted as ‘rescue aid’, while the former was found to be illegal 
and to be repaid to the Greek government (which has still not occurred). A further 
important ruling on state aid went against Belgian authorities at Charleroi airport, a 
hub for the LCC and new entrant, Ryanair. The Commission ruled that payments 
made in connection with opening new services represented unfair state aid.
47 What is 
clear is that the Commission has become stricter over time in the application of the 
state aid rules. 
 
The Commission has taken steps to extend the air transport regime through a number 
of measures. It has opened up ground-handling at airports to try to ensure there are 
competing providers and that an incumbent airline cannot use ownership of such 
                                                 
44 See Bulmer, Dolowitz, Humphreys and Padgett, Policy Transfer, p. 100. 
45 The Commission’s policy statement is in CEC, Report by the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament on the evaluation of aid schemes established in favour of Community air 
carriers, SEC(92) 431 final, Brussels: CEC, 19 March 1992. 
46 In the latter case it was a major factor contributing to the bankruptcy of Belgium’s SABENA as well 
as Swissair. 
47 These aids included payments made for each new service, preferential ground-handling charges and 
a ‘marketing contribution’ of €4 per passenger. See CEC ‘Commission Decision of 12 February 2004 
concerning advantages granted by the Walloon Region and Brussels South Charleroi Airport to the 
airline Ryanair in connection with its establishment at Charleroi’, at: 
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2004/l_137/l_13720040430en00010062.pdf, (accessed 1 May 
2007). 
  18facilities unfairly.
48 Progress has been slower on the pricing for airport services as 
well as on take-off and landing slots, where member states (and their airport 
authorities) have retained the whip hand.
49 A review of the third package was 
launched in 2003 and in July 2006 the Commission presented a proposed Regulation 
to tidy up some of the areas of ambiguity relating to the existing regime.
50 Over the 
period since liberalisation began the Commission’s competition directorate general 
has made extensive rulings on a range of issues: mergers and acquisitions, price-
fixing and airline alliances being notable amongst them.
51
 
The experience in air transport supports the argument that hierarchical governance 
arrangements enable strong policy transfer outcomes, imposing the principles and 
rules of liberal markets on member state authorities. The outcome was not full fidelity 
of policy transfer, as several challenges to the rules by the French, Italian and Greek 
authorities reveal. Clearly, the concept of ‘service public’ and a neo-mercantilist 
approach to ‘national champions’ were a factor. The main area where liberalization 
came under challenge was in connection with state aids. This was a different type of 
policy transfer, since there was no new legislation on this issue. Rather, it was more a 
matter of ensuring the state-aid regime was consistent with the philosophy of 
liberalization, with the European Commission issuing occasional policy 
communications. Hence it is not possible to see the mixed (but improving) 
performance on state aids as deficient policy transfer, since until 1992 there was no 
major policy pronouncement on state aids to airlines to transfer. The airlines involved 
in state aid investigations by the Commission show some correlation with the states 
which were reluctant liberalizers: France, Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain. The 
decline in occurrences of state aid suggests that national authorities and the airlines 
have learnt the new rules of the game, albeit imperfectly in Greece. 
  
Thus, when comparing the two sectors, there is little doubt that the mixed regime in 
telecommunications offers significant scope for the ‘domestication’ of EU-agreed 
principles and practices. By contrast, the hierarchical EU governance of air transport, 






In reviewing the evidence presented in this paper we make four broad conclusions.  
 
First, the two sectors revealed strikingly different dynamics. Whilst both sectors 
experienced technological change and a wave of deregulatory ideas originating in the 
                                                 
48 See Susanne Schmidt, ‘A constrained Commission: informal practices of agenda-setting in the 
Council’, in G. Schneider and M. Aspinwall (eds.), The rules of integration: institutionalist approaches 
to the study of Europe, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001, p. 135-8. 
49 See Bulmer, Dolowitz, Humphreys and Padgett, Policy Transfer in EU Governance, p. 107. For 
other new areas of intervention, see p. 109. 
50Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on common rules for the 
operation of air transport services in the Community (recast), COM(2006) 396 final, Brussels, 18 July 
2006: http://ec.europa.eu/transport/air_portal/competition/doc/acte_en.pdf, accessed 1 May 2007. 
51 See Bulmer, Dolowitz, Humphreys and Padgett, Policy Transfer in EU Governance, p. 104-6. 
52  Bulmer, Dolowitz, Humphreys and Padgett, Policy Transfer in European Union Governance, p. 
185. 
 
  19USA, their impact in the European context was distinct. In telecommunications the 
emergence of competing networks and the inability to maintain borders meant that the 
point at which the continued benefits of maintaining a protected regime were soon 
outweighed by the costs of resisting liberalisation. The centrality of an efficient 
telecommunications system for the economy’s well-being as well as for inward 
investment was key in introducing the dynamics of the competition state into the 
sector. For air transport, by contrast, borders and sovereignty were much more visible, 
thus enabling conservative member states to resist change. The costs of resisting 
liberalisation were much slower to show through. Regulatory competition was much 
less in evidence. 
 
Secondly, and following on from this point, the Commission’s usage of its 
hierarchical powers (Article 86) was working with the grain of the sectoral dynamics 
in telecommunications. Similarly, policy-making in the Council soon moved into a 
problem-solving mode, as member governments sought constructive ways to manage 
liberalisation. The character of the regime, with its scope for national discretion, 
created promoted policy transfer based on synthesis. The provision for, and use of, 
QMV only had supporting value. In air transport, by contrast, the EU’s institutional 
resources served as an independent variable. The critical Nouvelles Frontières ruling 
changed the default position away from an inertia that reflected the wishes of a 
majority of conservative governments. Instead, the default became the need to find 
regulatory certainty to avoid damaging competition rulings. Under these 
circumstances the ideas that were contained in the COMPAS Report, and which had 
influenced the Commission’s Memorandum No. 2, took on an influential position. As 
with telecommunications, but for different reasons, member governments adopted a 
problem-solving mode. In this case national preferences were met through time-
restricted derogations and a phased legislative process. The provision for QMV 
simply strengthened the dynamics that had developed prior to the Single European 
Act’s implementation. There was a much greater sense of emulation in the transfer of 
policy from ECAC and Memorandum No. 2, albeit mediated by lengthy transition 
periods. 
 
Thirdly, the operationalisation of the regulatory regimes highlights the different 
potentials for policy transfer of hierarchic and facilitated governance. The 
telecommunications regime was characterised by a hybrid pattern, whereby NRAs’ 
discretion mediated policy transfer from the EU level to the member states. National 
policy orientations, for instance towards the balance between market and service 
public, or the support to be given to national champions, varied. Some member states 
have appeared reluctant to give real regulatory power to the NRAs, and some national 
champions appear to have been favoured. National institutional profiles (regulatory 
policy styles, legal traditions, etc.) influenced in particular the character of the NRAs 
themselves. The Commission certainly had powers to enforce formal compliance, but 
its veto powers over NRA decisions were limited and, significantly, they did not 
extend to NRAs’ remedies for competition shortfalls. While a significant amount of 
policy learning was quite densely institutionalised both within the EU 
telecommunications comitology and between the NRAs themselves in the 
Independent Regulators Group, the fact remains that the EU regulatory regime 
allowed for considerable ‘domestication’. In air transport, by contrast, there was 
considerable fidelity in translating EU rules down to the member states. The latter 
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Commission, the latter sought to overrule discriminatory behaviour.  
 
Fourthly, the prime explanation for the weaker policy transfer capacity of the EU 
institutions in the case of telecommunications, despite the fact that EU institutions’ 
policy transfer capacity was plainly reinforced by globalization and new technologies, 
would seem to be best explained by the very strong competition state responses of EU 
member states to these very same exogenous pressures. The member states refused to 
relinquish control of telecommunications to the EU, in the manner of air transport.  
 
Air transport and telecommunications are crucial to the functioning of the modern 
economy. In each sector major changes have taken place over the last three decades. 
Our conclusion is that policy transfer can offer important insights into the dynamics 
of the policy process. In particular, when coupled with a robust methodology of 
process-tracing and elite interviewing, it can distinguish between the three competing 
sets of variables at play: external factors such as globalisation; the institutional 
resources of the EU itself; and the diversity of actor preferences and institutional 
profiles at national level. 
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